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I. INTRODUCTION
The title of my talk today is the “the future of public funding,”
and I am tempted to say “there’s not much future” for public funding.
The 2012 presidential election marked the first time since the
presidential public funding law was enacted in 1974 that neither
major party presidential candidate accepted public funding in the
general election and the first time that no significant contender for a
major party nomination accepted public funding in the primary phase.
Congressional public funding appears dead in the water. In the last
Congress, public funding proposals were referred to House and
Senate committees, where they promptly died. In the current
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School. This article was
presented at the Willamette University College of Law Symposium on Campaign Finance and
the 2012 Election on February 8, 2013.
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Congress, three bills were introduced in the House of Representatives,
but there is little reason to expect action on them. The dramatic rise
in independent spending through Super PACs and 501(c)
organizations in the last two election cycles significantly undermines
the prospect that public funding can achieve its traditional goals—
ameliorating the burdens of fundraising, promoting fair competition
among candidates, and reducing the role of private wealth on
elections and governance. At the state and local level, a number of
states and cities have adopted effective public funding programs. But
many of these systems were impaired, and some scrapped outright,
due to the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Arizona Free Enterprise
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett 1 striking down the so-called
“trigger” provision of Arizona’s public funding law. Indeed, Arizona
Free Enterprise is likely to be a barrier to the effectiveness of public
funding laws and, as a result, a disincentive to the adoption of such
laws.
On the other hand, the future of public funding may be
considered bright—or relatively bright—because public funding is the
only form of campaign finance reform that is both constitutionally
available and likely to have any impact on how we fund our elections
and on how our election funding affects governance. Citizens United
2
makes it absolutely clear—if it wasn’t before—that expenditure
limits are not constitutionally available—whether for candidates,
corporations, or any other campaign participants. Although Citizens
United also makes it clear that contribution limits and disclosure
remain constitutionally available, they are not likely to have much
impact. After SpeechNow 3 and similar court of appeals’ decisions,
not only is independent spending unlimitable, but also donations to
committees engaged in independent spending are unlimitable. In the
last election cycle we saw nominally independent committees formed
to support a specific candidate, operated by individuals previously
affiliated with the candidate and aided by candidates soliciting funds
for those committees, air messages closely tracking those of the
candidate. Under these circumstances, limits on contributions to
candidates and even limits on contributions to groups that give to
candidates seem increasingly beside the point. The Supreme Court
has strongly endorsed disclosure, but the emergence of nominally
1. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
2. Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310 (2010).
3. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (2010).
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nonelectoral committees not subject to disclosure laws as major
campaign players undermines the effectiveness of existing disclosure
requirements. Even if those laws can be strengthened, it is unclear
whether and to what extent disclosure constrains the powerful
influence of large donors on elections and governance, which has
long been a driving concern behind campaign finance reform.
So, weakened as it is by Arizona Free Enterprise, public funding
remains the only game in town. Indeed, after Citizens United,
SpeechNow, and the rise of Super PACs and 501(c)’s, its importance
is greater than ever. But what we can expect public funding to do and
how we design our public funding laws will have to change. It is no
longer possible—if it ever was—for public funding to take private
funding out of elections, to limit campaign spending, or to equalize
resources among candidates. It is not clear whether these were ever
desirable or attainable goals within our political system. They are
certainly not attainable now. But public funding can still be used to
lower the barriers to political entry for challengers and political
newcomers; to reduce, even if not eliminate, the burdens of
fundraising; to reduce, even if not eliminate, unequal funding among
candidates; to increase the role of small donors and diversify the
donor base; and to reduce, although not eliminate, the role of big
money in our politics. With scaled down expectations, public funding
has a vital role to play in our campaign finance system.
In my comments today, I want to briefly trace the development
of the law of public funding in the United States, assess the impact of
the Arizona Free Enterprise decision on public funding, and discuss
the options for public funding after Arizona Free Enterprise.
II. THE ORIGINS OF PUBLIC FUNDING
In his Seventh Annual Message to Congress on December 3,
1907, President Theodore Roosevelt proposed what he acknowledged
was a “very radical measure”—public funding of election campaigns.
Roosevelt had previously called for both a federal disclosure law and
restrictions on corporate campaign contributions, and Congress had
adopted a corporate contribution ban when it passed the Tillman Act
earlier in 1907. But Roosevelt warned that merely imposing limits
would not be enough to reform campaign finance. “[L]aws of this
kind,” that is, regulations of private campaign money, “from their
very nature are difficult of enforcement,” Roosevelt observed, and,
thus, posed the “danger” that they would be “obeyed only by the
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honest, and disobeyed by the unscrupulous, so as to act only as a
penalty upon honest men.” “Moreover,” he continued, “no such law
would hamper an unscrupulous man of unlimited means from buying
his own way into office.” Public financing would solve the problem
of evasion of contribution limits and directly address the power of the
wealthy. “The need for collecting large campaign funds would
vanish,” Roosevelt urged, “if Congress provided an appropriation for
the proper and legitimate expenses” of political campaigns.
Roosevelt was not seeking to cut back on campaign spending.
Indeed, he urged that the appropriation be “ample enough to meet the
necessity for thorough organization and machinery, which requires a
large expenditure of money.” But if an “ample” appropriation were
made, public funding could provide a more effective reform than
limiting large private contributions and requiring disclosure. 4
Roosevelt conceded that “it will take some time for people so to
familiarize themselves with such a proposal as to be willing to
consider its adoption.” 5 He was certainly right about that. The first
bill proposing public funding of federal elections was not introduced
into Congress until a half-century after his 1907 Message. It took
another decade for the idea to be taken seriously by Congress, and
when Congress acted, it limited public funding to presidential
elections. Public funding has made more progress at the state and
local level—some fifteen states have some form of public funding for
candidates for some offices—with Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, and
Minnesota providing public funding for legislative candidates as well
as candidates for statewide office, and North Carolina and West
Virginia targeting judicial elections. 6 An additional ten states provide
funds to political parties, although these tend to be very modest
sums. 7 In 2009, fourteen local governments, including New York
City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Austin, and Albuquerque, also
operated public funding programs. 8
4. Theodore Roosevelt, Seventh Annual Message, December 3, 1907, available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29548.
5. Id.
6. Public Financing of Campaigns: An Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/public-financing-of-camp
aigns-overview.aspx (last updated Jan. 23, 2013). As this article was going to press, North
Carolina was on the verge of repealing its public funding law. See Matthew Burns, Senate
backs sweeping elections bill, WRAL.COM (July 24, 2013), http://www.wral.com/senate-backs
-sweeping-elections-bill/12699232/.
7. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 6.
8. Jessica A. Levinson & Smith Long, Mapping Public Financing in American
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III. WHAT EXACTLY IS PUBLIC FUNDING?
Public funding is a capacious concept. It could mean any use of
public resources to provide funds to, or to reduce the campaign costs
of, candidates or political parties. This could include tax credits or
tax deductions for campaign contributions; public assumption of some
of the costs of campaigning, such as voter registration; governmental
publication and dissemination of voter pamphlets in which candidates
or parties can insert campaign messages; and in-kind assistance, such
as free postage for campaign mailings, free use of public rooms or
schools for campaign meetings, free billboards for the display of
campaign messages, and, most importantly, free or reduced cost
access to radio and television for campaign advertisements. But in
American campaign finance parlance, “public funding” refers to the
direct provision of public funds—or as public funding opponents like
to emphasize, tax dollars—to candidates or political parties to be used
for campaign purposes. In all existing American public funding
programs, payment is made by the government directly to qualifying
candidates or political parties. Several academics have proposed
plans in which the government would give the voters campaign
vouchers—like food stamps—which they could send to the candidates
of their choosing, who would redeem them at the Treasury for
money. 9 No jurisdiction in the United States has adopted such a
voucher plan.
Even when limited to cash payments to candidates or parties,
public funding programs exhibit considerable variation. Indeed,
every public funding program requires the resolution of multiple basic
questions, including: Is the money paid to candidates or parties?
Which elections are covered? Which candidates (or parties) are
eligible to receive public funds? How much do they get, and how is
that calculated? What conditions apply? Where does the money come
from? With no two programs answering these questions in exactly the
same way, the permutations are substantial. But a few generalizations
can be made.

Elections, CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES (Jan. 2009), http://policyarchive.org/handle/10
207/bitstreams/95926.pdf.
9. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002); Richard Hasen, Clipping Coupons for
Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIF.
L. REV. 1 (1996).
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A. Candidates or Parties?
Most public funding programs in the United States involve
payments to candidates, not parties. This distinguishes American
programs from public funding around the world, which generally
focuses on political parties. The American approach reflects the
candidate-centered nature of our contemporary election campaigns. It
is also consistent with the major role played by internal party
elections—that is, party primaries—in selecting party nominees. It
would be difficult for a party-centered public funding system to
finance candidates in internal party primaries. At the federal level,
the presidential public funding program provides the parties with
funds to cover the costs of their national nominating conventions, but
the parties are not given any money for campaign expenses.

B. Which Elections?
Public funding programs vary in the scope of their electoral
coverage. At the federal level, the only election covered is the race
for president. Similarly, some states also focus exclusively on the
election for chief executive. Other states provide funds for candidates
for other statewide elective offices. North Carolina’s program
initially provided funds only to judicial candidates; 10 judicial
elections were also the focus of West Virginia’s pilot public funding
program. Arizona, Connecticut, Maine, and New York City provide
public funds to candidates for legislative office as well as statewide
office. A separate question is whether public funding should be
available only in the general election or also in party primaries.
Recognizing the central role that party primaries play in the American
political process and the fact that in many one-party jurisdictions the
party primary can be the only real election, most American public
funding systems subsidize candidates in both primaries and general
elections.

C. Who Qualifies?
In most elections, there are many candidates who qualify for a
place on the ballot but who are unlikely to engage the attention of a
significant portion of the electorate. To avoid wasting taxpayer
dollars on such marginal or “frivolous” candidates, all public funding
10. As this article was going to press, North Carolina was on the verge of repealing its
public funding program for judicial elections. See supra note 6.
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laws apply tests for defining, and limiting funds to, serious
contenders. Typically, candidates qualify either by (i) raising a
threshold amount of money from a requisite number of donors with,
typically, the size of the contribution that counts toward qualification
capped at a relatively small amount; (ii) winning a party nomination;
or (iii) winning a certain percentage of the vote in the election. The
primary component of the presidential public funding system uses the
first method—qualification by raising a certain number of small
donations. This is also the dominant form of qualification in most
state and local systems. The presidential general election public
funding program combines the second and third criteria—major party
nominees, and nominees of minor parties that received more than five
percent of the vote in the preceding presidential election receive funds
upon nomination; while new party, smaller minor party, and
independent candidates qualify for post-election funding if they
receive a threshold percentage of the vote.

D. Partial or Full Funding?
The presidential general election public funding program is
unusual in that it is intended to provide participating candidates with
full public funding, although that goal has been effectively
undermined by the creative development and exploitation of
loopholes in the law. State and local “clean money” programs, such
as those in Maine and Arizona, are also aimed at eliminating any role
for private funds once a candidate qualifies for public funds by raising
a specified amount of small, private donations. A qualifying
candidate is given a flat grant intended to cover the cost of the rest of
the campaign, and the candidate agrees not to accept any private
funds after taking the public grant. Other public funding programs
provide only partial public funding. Under small-donor matching
systems, candidates qualify for funding by raising a threshold amount
of small donations and then receive public funds that match
subsequent small private contributions. The match can be a multiple
of the small private donation; New York City, for example, matches
donations of up to $175 at a rate of six-to-one, up to a ceiling. In
small-donor matching systems, candidates may also be able to accept
larger, nonmatchable contributions, subject to the jurisdiction’s
general contribution limit.
Whether a program is partial or full applies only to an individual
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candidate’s campaign funds. Under Buckley v. Valeo, 11 there cannot
be mandatory full public funding of an entire election campaign, nor
can the decision of one candidate to take public funding affect the
freedom of other campaign participants to use private funds.
Individual candidates are always free to choose not to take public
funding and instead rely on private contributions, or their own
personal wealth. So, too, political parties and politically active
organizations and individuals are free to fund independent spending
that supports or opposes publicly-funded candidates.

E. Spending Limits
Spending limits are inherent in a full public funding program. If
the public grant is intended to fully replace private funds, then the
amount of the grant automatically becomes a spending limit.
Spending limits are not logically entailed in partial public funding
programs. The public grant could operate as a floor, with candidates
permitted to raise and spend as much as they want in private
donations (presumably with dollar limits on the size of the donations).
But all American public funding programs that make payments to
candidates, including those that provide only partial public funding,
come with a spending limit. (The handful of programs that provide
grants to political parties do not have spending limits, but these
usually involve very small grants which are clearly supplementary to
privately raised funds.) Indeed, for many people, part of public
funding’s appeal has been that it provides a means of getting
candidates to agree to a spending limit. Again, of course, as much as
a candidate’s decision to take public funding cannot affect the use of
private funds by other candidates, the spending limit does not apply to
nonparticipating candidates or other campaign actors.

F. Source of Funds
A curious feature of many American public funding programs is
that they rely on an unusual source of funds—the taxpayer checkoff.
The presidential public funding program set the pattern. The money
from the program is derived from taxes paid by those taxpayers who
choose to dedicate a portion of their tax liability—initially one dollar
for a single filer and two dollars for a couple, and now three dollars
and six dollars—to the program. Many states similarly rely on the
11. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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taxpayer checkoff. Other states, and nearly all the local governments
that have adopted public funding, rely on general revenues or specific
earmarked fees and fines, not the checkoff.
IV. PUBLIC FUNDING AND THE SUPREME COURT
Of all the forms of campaign finance regulation, public funding
presents the least constitutional difficulty. In Buckley v. Valeo, the
Supreme Court held that public financing of election campaigns falls
within Congress’s power under the General Welfare Clause. 12 The
Court determined that Congress could find public financing advances
three goals: reducing “the deleterious influence of large contributions
on our political process,” “facilitat[ing] communication by candidates
with the electorate,” and “free[ing] candidates from the rigors of
fundraising.” 13 As the Court further observed, “[i]t cannot be
gainsaid that public financing as a means of eliminating the improper
influence of large private contributions furthers a significant
government interest.” 14 The Court also noted that public funding
fitted well with a program of limiting private contributions. As
contribution limits “necessarily increase the burden of fundraising,”
Congress could “properly regard[]” public financing as an appropriate
means of relieving candidates from the “rigors of soliciting private
contributions.” 15 The Court summarily rejected the argument that
giving public money to candidates and parties violates the First
Amendment “by analogy” to the First Amendment’s “noestablishment” clause for religion. 16 So, too, it dismissed the
assertion that public funding would “lead to governmental control of
the internal affairs of political parties, and thus to a significant loss of
political freedom.” 17 The Court found the public funding program did
“not abridge, restrict or censor speech” but instead “use[d] public
money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in
the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.” 18 In
short, public funding advances First Amendment values.
Buckley also upheld two specific, and basic, components of the

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 96.
Id.
See id. at 92.
Id. at 93 n.126.
Id. at 92–93.
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presidential public funding program: conditioning the grant of public
funds on a candidate’s acceptance of a spending limit; and the
statutory formulas for determining which candidates are eligible to
receive public funds and how much they can receive. Although
Buckley struck down spending limits on candidates and independent
groups, it easily upheld the spending limits that accompany
presidential public funding. In a two-sentence footnote, the Court
simply asserted:
Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns
and may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement by
the candidate to abide by specified expenditure limitations. Just as
a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he
chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo private fundraising and
accept public funding. 19

The Court gave more attention to the claim that the formulas for
determining eligibility for, and the size of, the public grant
discriminated against minor parties, independents, and, in the
primaries, candidates with lesser fundraising abilities. But the Court
rejected this constitutional challenge. The Court found that Congress
could differentiate among candidates so as not to “fund[] hopeless
candidacies with large sums of public money” or provide public
assistance to “candidates without significant public support.” 20
The Supreme Court has considered public funding questions
only three times since Buckley. The first two cases, decided in the
first decade after Buckley, involved the presidential public funding
law. In Republican National Committee v. FEC (RNC ), 21 the Court
summarily affirmed a three-judge court decision rejecting the claims
that in practice—as evidenced in the 1976 campaign—candidates
were coerced into accepting public funding so that the candidate
spending limit was unconstitutional, and that the provision of the
presidential public funding law restricting coordinated spending by a
party whose candidate accepted public funding violated the party’s
First Amendment rights. 22 In FEC v. National Conservative Political

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 57 n.65.
Id. at 96.
445 U.S. 955 (1980).
See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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Action Committee (NCPAC ), 23 the Court invalidated the provision
of the presidential public funding law limiting independent
expenditures in support of or in opposition to a publicly-funded
presidential candidate to $1,000. Buckley had held unconstitutional
the general limit on independent spending, but had not specifically
addressed the independent spending limit in the presidential public
funding law. Taking Buckley, RNC, and NCPAC together, a
candidate’s receipt of public funding can be conditioned on his
acceptance of a spending limit and his party limiting its coordinated
expenditures, but the provision of public funding—and a candidate’s
acceptance of public funding—has no impact on the rights of
independent spenders.
The third major case—decided in 2011—is Arizona Free
Enterprise,24 which dealt with the so-called “trigger” provision of
Arizona’s public funding law. Although not part of the presidential
public funding law, trigger provisions—also known as “fair fight” or
“rescue” funds—became a common part of many state and local
public funding laws, starting in the 1990s. Under a trigger law,
spending by privately-funded candidates who have declined public
funding or by independent committees concerning a publicly-funded
candidate can “trigger” a change in the rules governing a publiclyfunded candidate. If the nonparticipating candidate spends more than
the spending limit for the publicly-funded candidate—or if the
combination of nonparticipant spending and supportive independent
spending rises above that ceiling—something happens. Either the
state will provide the publicly-funded candidate with additional funds
up to some new, higher limit, or the publicly-funded candidate would
be free to solicit and spend additional private funds.
Trigger laws reflect two concerns that developed as experience
with public funding increased. First, candidates may be reluctant to
accept public funding with a spending limit because their
opponents—with or without the support of independent committees—
are not subject to limits and can, thus, outspend them. The extent of
this concern may depend on the size of the public grant relative to the
cost of an effective campaign, as well as the resources available to the
candidate’s opponent. From the perspective of the publicly-funded
candidate, if the public funds are much less than the money being
spent against her, the spending limit becomes a form of unilateral
23. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
24. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).

49-4, BRIFFAULT, ME FORMAT.DOC

532

WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW

2/17/2014 5:24 PM

[49:521

disarmament. The trigger funds—or even simply release from the
spending limit with permission to raise additional private
contributions—alleviate that concern and make public funding more
attractive to candidates. Second, “it is exceedingly difficult to get the
level of public subsidy right.” 25 Although the standard public funding
grant or match level may be adequate for most races in a jurisdiction,
in any given year the election in a particular race or district may be
especially hotly contested. It would be impossible to determine in
advance which specific elections in a particular election year will be
more competitive than others, and it would be wasteful to pump more
public funds into all elections just to ensure that more money is
available in those elections where it is most needed. On the other
hand, too small a grant would discourage participation in the program.
High levels of spending by other campaign actors—nonparticipating
candidates and independent committees—are an excellent marker of
which elections are especially competitive.
Triggers provide
desirable flexibility by allowing the level of public funding, or the
mix of public and private funds, to respond to the conditions of
specific elections.
Prior to 2010, all but one of the lower federal courts that had
heard challenges to state trigger laws had sustained the trigger
provisions, finding the laws promote rather than burden campaign
speech and are justified by the state’s interest in making public
funding effective and attractive to candidates. On the first point, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained, in
upholding the trigger provision of Maine’s clean money law in
Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Practices, 26 that
nonparticipating candidates and committees “have no right to speak
free from response.” 27 Indeed, the court rejected the very idea “which
equates responsive speech with an impairment to the initial
speaker.” 28 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina Right to
Life v. Leake 29 agreed that responsive funds do not impinge on First
Amendment rights, as nonparticipating candidates and independent
25. Stephen Ansolabehere, Arizona Free Enterprise v Bennett and the Problem of
Campaign Finance, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 53–54.
26. 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding provision providing up to double the initial
distribution of public funds).
27. Id. at 464.
28. Id. at 465.
29. 524 F.3d 427 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding trigger funds equal to two times the trigger
threshold).
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committees “remain free to raise and spend as much money, and
engage in as much political speech, as they desire. They will not be
jailed, fined, or censured if they exceed trigger amounts.” 30 The
distribution of additional public funds to their opponents triggered by
their actions “‘furthers, not abridges pertinent First Amendment
values’ by ensuring that the participating candidate will have an
opportunity to engage in responsive speech.” 31
On the second point, these courts recognized that many
candidates are unlikely to accept public funding with its spending
limit unless there is some kind of escape hatch enabling them to
respond to high levels of spending by nonparticipating opponents or
independent committees. As the Eighth Circuit explained:
[T]his provision removes the disincentive a candidate may have to
participate in the public financing system because of the
candidate’s fear of being grossly outspent by a well-financed,
privately funded opponent. Absent such a safeguard, the State
could reasonably believe that far fewer candidates would enroll in
its campaign-financing program, with its binding limitation on
campaign expenditures, because of the candidates’ concerns of
placing their candidacy at an insurmountable disadvantage. 32

Other courts agreed that “[t]he provision prevents the publicly-funded
candidate from being penalized for deciding to accept public funds.” 33
In Arizona Free Enterprise, however, a five-justice majority of
the Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. In an opinion by Chief
Justice Roberts, the Court found that providing additional public
funds to candidates as a response to high levels of spending by
privately-funded candidates or independent committees does burden
the speech of those candidates and committees by operating as a

30. Id. at 437.
31. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1976)).
32. Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1554 (8th Cir. 1996).
33. Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916, 928 (W.D. Ky. 1995). Other decisions in this
period upholding trigger fund laws include Ass’n of American Physicians & Surgeons v.
Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Ariz. 2005) and Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 537 F.
Supp. 2d 359 (D. Conn. 2008). The one case before 2010 that went the other way was Day v.
Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), which struck down a Minnesota law that both raised
the spending limit and increased the public funding allotment for a candidate targeted by
opposing independent expenditures. Day was subsequently distinguished by the same court in
Rosenstiel, 101 F.3d at 1555, and as a result was considered to be of dubious precedential
value by other courts. See Daggett, 205 F.3d at 464 n.25; Leake, 524 F.3d at 438.
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penalty for spending above the trigger threshold. 34
Once a privately financed candidate has raised or spent more
than the State’s initial grant to a publicly financed candidate, each
personal dollar spent by the privately financed candidate results in
an award of almost one additional dollar to his opponent. That
plainly forces the privately financed candidate to ‘shoulder a
special and potentially significant burden’ when choosing to
exercise his First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of his
candidacy. 35

Similarly, for the independent committee,
[j]ust as with the candidate the independent group supports, the
more money spent on that candidate’s behalf or in opposition to a
publicly funded candidate, the more money the publicly funded
candidate receives from the State . . . . [T]he effect of a dollar
spent on election speech is a guaranteed financial payout to the
publicly funded candidate the group opposes. 36

Even if the trigger funds “result in more speech by publicly-funded
candidates and more speech in general,” that still burdens the speech
of privately-funded candidates and independent groups. 37 For the
Roberts Court, this smacked too much of the equalization of
campaign speech that Buckley had rejected as a justification for
spending limits. 38
Having determined that trigger funds operate as a burden on
speech, the Court found that burden could not be justified by the
state’s interest in promoting its public funding program. The Court
emphasized that the core constitutional interest justifying campaign
34. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2818–19
(2011). In so concluding, the Court relied heavily on its 2008 decision in Davis v. FEC, 554
U.S. 724 (2008), striking down the Millionaires’ Amendment provision of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002. See Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2817–24. Indeed, after
Davis, two courts of appeals concluded that trigger laws were unconstitutional. See Green
Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010); Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 (11th
Cir. 2010).
35. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2818.
36. Id. at 2819.
37. Id. at 2821.
38. Id. at 2820–21. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion was joined by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Kagan wrote the dissenting opinion joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
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finance restrictions is the prevention of corruption and the appearance
of corruption. While public funding can advance that interest, and
trigger funds “might well promote participation in public funding,”
that served the state’s anti-corruption interest only “indirectly” and
was inadequate to justify the burden on political speech resulting from
the provision of trigger funds. 39
V. PUBLIC FUNDING AFTER ARIZONA FREE ENTERPRISE

Arizona Free Enterprise has had an immediate impact on state
public funding laws. The trigger provisions in Maine’s clean money
law 40 and West Virginia’s pilot public funding program for judicial
elections 41 have already been invalidated, and, due to lack of
severability, the entire Nebraska public funding law has been struck
down because of its trigger provision. 42 The trigger fund provisions
in the Connecticut and Florida public funding laws had already been
invalidated as Arizona Free Enterprise was making its way to the
Supreme Court. 43 Without the availability of the trigger fund
mechanism, it will surely be more difficult to get public funding
adopted or to persuade elected officials to take public funding when it
is available. The inclusion of trigger mechanisms in many of the state
public funding laws adopted in the past decade—including Arizona,
Connecticut, Maine, and North Carolina—reflect the practical
recognition that with nonparticipating candidates and independent
committees potentially able to raise and spend funds without limit, a
candidate who accepts limited public funds plus a spending limit risks
putting herself at a competitive disadvantage.
Still, Arizona Free Enterprise need not and should not mean the
end of public funding. First, it is not clear that Arizona Free
Enterprise dooms all trigger mechanisms. Although states and local
governments may not be able to provide more public funds in
response to private spending, they might still be able to respond to
high levels of private spending by lifting spending limits, and
allowing publicly-funded candidates to raise and spend private funds.
To be sure, that would be a response to spending by another candidate
39. Id. at 2826–28.
40. See Cushing v. McKee, 853 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Me. 2012).
41. State ex rel Loughry v. Tennant, 732 S.E.2d 507, 518 (W. Va. 2012).
42. State ex rel Bruning v. Gale, 817 N.W.2d 768, 784 (Neb. 2012).
43. See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010); Scott v. Roberts,
612 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2010).
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or a committee and so arguably a “penalty” for the other spender, but
the response would not involve the provision of any public funds—
which was a sore point in the Court’s assessment of Arizona’s law. 44
Nor would the state be discriminating against privately-funded
candidates as long as the contribution limit for donations to the
publicly-funded candidate is not higher than the limits on donations to
privately-funded candidates. 45
A second option, particularly for flat grant or clean money
programs, would be to provide a much larger public grant to
qualifying candidates. The larger grant, which might very well be a
good idea in its own right—the presidential public grant is far, far less
than the cost of contemporary presidential election campaigns—
would provide candidates with an assurance of adequate funding.
Indeed, unlike trigger funds, the larger grant would be both
guaranteed and available to the publicly-funded candidate at the
outset of the campaign, and thus far more useful to a candidate than
trigger funds, which may come very late in the election cycle.
Indeed, there is some evidence from Arizona of privately-funded
candidates timing their expenditures so late in the election as to make
it difficult for publicly-funded candidates to actually get the trigger
funds in a timely way. But the availability of a very large grant also
has the potential for wasting money unnecessarily in noncompetitive
races. This could be addressed by conditioning the grant on the
presence of well-funded opponents, or by requiring candidates to
return unused funds at the end of the campaign—although it’s not
clear what incentive the candidate would have to be frugal. In any
event, a more generous grant is likely to increase political resistance
to the program and make public funding more difficult to attain.
VI. AN ARGUMENT FOR PUBLIC FUNDING WITHOUT SPENDING LIMITS
A third option is to eliminate spending limits from public
funding programs altogether. The justifications for a spending limit
are: (i) that it equalizes the resources available to competing
candidates and, thus, promotes fair competition; and (ii) that it holds
down the amount of money spent in an election. Moreover, in a full
public funding system, like the presidential general election public
44. Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2818–19.
45. That distinguishes this proposal from the law struck down in Davis v. FEC, 554
U.S. 728 (2008), which raised the contribution limit for a candidate whose opponent
contributed a large amount of personal funds to his campaign.
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funding program or state clean money systems, the spending limit is
built into the idea of full public funding, as the candidate can only
spend as much as the state provides him. Full public funding plus a
spending limit is also intended to eliminate (iii) the burden of fundraising on candidates and (iv) the special influence that large donors
can obtain over elections and the behavior of elected officials grateful
for or dependent on their donations. Without a spending limit, and
with, after Arizona Free Enterprise, the additional sums necessarily
raised by private contributions, these goals are arguably unattainable.
But the first of these goals—reduction of total spending—should
not be a campaign finance reform objective at all, and the second
goal—equalization of resources for candidates—is unattainable under
current constitutional doctrine. The third and fourth goals—reduction
of special interest influence and amelioration of the burdens of
fundraising—are both desirable and constitutionally attainable, but
they can be advanced without spending limits.
Although commentators regularly decry the cost of election
campaigns, arguing for a reduction in total spending is a
fundamentally mistaken objection to our current campaign finance
system. Election expenditures consist of communications and voter
mobilization activities—efforts to present facts, arguments, other
information to the voters, and to facilitate their participation in
elections. These efforts advance our democratic system. The
problems with our campaign finance system relate to the uneven
resources across candidates and the influence of large donors on
elections and governance, not the level of spending per se.
With respect to the unequal resources of candidates, current
constitutional doctrine makes equalization impossible. So long as
spending limits on candidates and independent groups, limits on the
use of candidate personal wealth, and trigger funds are
unconstitutional, candidate equalization is unattainable. To be sure,
public funding can promote some equalization by leveling up, that is,
by providing public funds to qualifying candidates who have only
limited access to private resources (particularly, challengers and
political newcomers). The public grant can, thus, provide a measure
of equality by enabling underfunded candidates to get their campaigns
off the ground. In many elections, providing such public funding
functions as a kind of seed money that may enable a candidate to run
a competitive campaign against a better-funded opponent. But under
current constitutional doctrine true equalization of campaign funding
is impossible and, thus, needs to be dropped from the goals of
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campaign finance reform.
That leaves reduction of special interest influence and the
amelioration of the burdens of fundraising. Public funding, even
without spending limits, can still advance those goals, even if their
complete achievement is unattainable. The provision of some public
funds will, to that extent, make the pursuit of large private donations
less necessary and large donors less influential. The design of the
public funding system can promote these goals, even without a
spending limit. In a flat grant system, the larger the initial public
grant, the less the need for and the less the dependence on private
donations. In a matching grant system, the greater the match ratio—
such as 4:1, 5:1, or 6:1 for small donations of, say, under $200—the
less the dependence on large donations and the less the influence of
large donors. Certainly, such a small donor leveraged-match system
may be said to increase the time burden of fundraising. But smalldonor fundraising differs in its form and its target from the “dialing
for dollars” or big-ticket fundraising events central to the private
fundraising system. With candidates having to reach out to, contact,
and respond to a much larger number of smaller givers, small-donor
fundraising resembles campaigning more than traditional fundraising. Indeed, there is evidence that New York City, which has the
most generous match and caps matchable donations at the relatively
low level of $175, has not only many more small donors, but the
donors to publicly-funded candidates are far more racially,
economically, and socially diverse than donors to nonparticipating
candidates. 46 To the extent that fundraising involves widespread
contact with broader elements of the public, it approaches
campaigning, and is no more objectionable than campaigning itself.
Of course, the elimination of spending limits means the end of
the idea of full public funding. But full public funding was an illusion
anyway. The system was never fully publicly funded as long as
candidates are free to not participate, and independent committees and
individuals can spend as much as they want in private funds in
support of or in opposition to candidates—including publicly-funded
candidates.
The future of public funding is likely to consist either of small
donor matching programs, like New York City’s, or so-called hybrid
46. See Michael J. Malbin, Peter W. Brusoe, & Brendan Glavin, Small Donors, Big
Democracy: New York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11
ELECTION L.J. 3 (2012).
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systems in which candidates get a base amount in a flat grant but can
participate in competitive races by raising additional, matchable,
small donations. Pure flat grant systems are simply unable to respond
to competitive elections without very large initial grants, and small
donor matching programs have the additional appeal of providing an
incentive to candidates to seek the participation of small donors. Still,
as long as these programs include spending limits, there is the
possibility that they will be inadequate to competitive races and
disadvantage public-funding participants.
My suggestion would be to scrap spending limits completely.
Public funding would still enable candidates without personal wealth,
wealthy backers, or access to special interest financial support to
mount campaigns. With small donor matches, the candidates who are
better at raising small donations, which presumably reflects some
popular appeal, would be able to mount increasingly well-funded
campaigns. In theory, the state or city could keep on matching—
presumably at a decreased ratio—as long as the candidate keeps
raising funds. More likely, at some point, the jurisdiction could
decide the public has helped the candidate enough, and stop providing
the candidate with more money, but let him continue to raise (subject
to standard contribution limits) and spend private money if he deems
that necessary. Such a system of public funding without limits would
lower barriers to entry and boost challengers, political outsiders, and
candidates without personal wealth or wealthy backers—and reduce
the role of large donors in the system—without curbing the ability of
publicly supported candidates to respond to unlimited spending by
other candidates or independent groups. Public funding under this
system would also be available to incumbents and candidates with
access to larger donors. But if they want to participate in this
system—and be less dependent on large donors—so much the better.
Given our campaign finance jurisprudence, our system will
inevitably be at least to some degree privately-funded. Public funding
laws can supplement and complement private funds—by making it
easier for candidates without personal wealth or support from large
donors to run, and by encouraging candidates to pursue small
donations—and in so doing these laws can promote fair competition
among candidates, increase political speech and participation, and
reduce the role of large private wealth. But public funding cannot
replace private funds. That being the case, we need to think about the
rules that promote the best combination of public and private funding.
Spending limits handicap publicly-funded candidates without
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advancing any of the attainable and desirable goals of public funding.
For that reason, eliminating spending limits would make public
funding more attractive to candidates and more effective at attaining
the goals of campaign finance reform.

